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Abstract 
Many economists suspect that downward nominal wage rigidities in ongoing labor contracts are an 
important source of employment fluctuations over the business cycle but there is little direct empirical 
evidence on this conjecture. This paper compares three occupations in the housing sector with very 
different wage setting institutions, real estate agents, architects, and construction workers. I study the wage 
and employment responses of these occupations to the housing cycle, a proxy for labor demand shocks to 
the industry. The employment of real estate agents, whose pay is far more flexible than the other 
occupations, indeed reacts less to the cycle than employment in the other occupations. However, unless 
labor demand elasticities are large, the estimates do not suggest that the level of wage flexibility enjoyed 
by real estate agents would buffer employment fluctuations in response to demand shocks by more than 10 
to 20 percent compared to completely rigid wages. 
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1 Introduction 
In the traditional Keynesian model, unemployment occurs during recessions because nominal 
wages are downwardly rigid.  Firms lay off works rather than lowering their wages in 
recessions.  Such explanations for employment fluctuations over the business cycles retain 
their appeal in modern discussions (e.g. Bewley, 2002).  While downward wage rigidity is 
well documented (see below), there is much less evidence linking wage rigidity directly to 
employment fluctuations or unemployment.  This paper intends to contribute to this debate by 
comparing the employment response of three different housing market related occupations, 
real estate agents, architects, and construction workers, to the housing market cycle.   
The focus on three such narrow occupations is interesting because pay arrangements differ 
substantially across these occupations.  Real estate agents receive most or all of their pay in 
the form of commissions.  As a result, the “wage” implicit in their employment arrangement 
is in essence fully flexible.  If the housing market turns down and prices fall or transactions 
dry up, the earnings of real estate agents drop commensurately.  There is no a priori reason 
for brokerages (the employers of agents) to lay off agents; the same number of agents could 
stay in their job at the new lower wage.  Of course, agents may decide to quit when 
employment is becoming less attractive as these workers move along their labor supply 
curve.  Architects and construction workers, on the other hand, are largely paid on standard 
wage and salary contracts, although overtime pay and bonuses, which provide some degree of 
flexibility, are common in these occupations.  As these occupations should also be affected 
by the housing cycle, they serve as a useful control group for the real estate agents. 
Apart from the different contractual arrangements, another attraction for studying the housing 
market are the large booms and busts, which have taken place in the market over the past 15 
years.  Moreover, there are large differences in the amplitude of housing market cycles across 
different parts of the United States.  Figure 1 shows house prices in California, Indiana, and 
New York.  States on both coasts saw large run ups in prices during the 2000s while price 
increases were modest in in the Midwest.  The figure also shows that the bust in the housing 
market after 2006 was much more pronounced in California than in New York. 
In this paper, I am exploiting this variation in fluctuations in house prices and transactions 
across states and time in the 2000s.  I utilize these fluctuations as a proxy for labor demand 
shocks for the occupations under study.  For real estate agents the connection is a very direct 
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one: their commission is a percentage of the transactions value so that the product of prices 
and transactions directly affects their earnings.  For architects and construction workers the 
connection is more indirect but new housing starts tend to be closely related to the housing 
cycle. 
I interpret fluctuations in the housing market as shocks to the labor demand for the 
occupations I study.  The compensation of both real estate agents and architects is small 
compared to the total value of houses or housing transactions so that shocks originating from 
the labor markets for these workers are unlikely to play any significant role in overall 
movements of the housing market.  For construction workers this may be more problematic 
as the costs of construction are a larger portion of new housing costs.  Nevertheless, the 
perception of most observers is that housing market fluctuations primarily stem from demand 
side pressures. For example, Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks (2005) and Glaeser, Gyourko and 
Saiz (2008) explain the divergent housing cycles across US cities by an interaction of 
increasing housing demand and land use regulations.  Gyourko and Saiz (2006) find that 
construction costs did not contribute to the recent observed housing price cycles. 
Combining data from the American Community Survey (ACS) and the Quarterly of 
Workforce Indicators (QWI) with real estate prices and transactions mostly for the first 
decade in the 2000s, I estimate the response of wages and employment in each of the 
occupations with respect to the value of transactions in the housing market.  Since the scaling 
of these responses will naturally differ depending on how directly the occupation is affected 
by these market fluctuations, my preferred measure is to divide the employment response by 
the wage response to obtain an elasticity which can be thought of as the labor supply or 
inverse wage setting elasticity for the occupation.  The estimated elasticities are around 2 to 3 
for real estate agents, 3 to 4 for architects, and large but variable for construction workers.  
These results are consistent with the idea that the wage setting curve for real estate agents is 
the most upward sloping while it is much more elastic for the other occupations.   These 
estimates are effectively IV estimates of employment on wages instrumenting with housing 
market fluctuations.  These estimated elasticities line up according to the flexibility with 
which wages are set in the different occupations.  However, the elasticities for architects and 
construction workers are estimated imprecisely because their wage responses are very 
modest.  While the pattern is right, a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that 
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the differences are not large enough to explain much of the employment fluctuations over 
business cycle. 
This paper relates to a large literature documenting pervasive downward nominal wage 
rigidity.   Prominent examples are Card and Hyslop (1997), Kahn (1997), and Altonji and 
Devereux (2000) for the US and Dickens et al. (2007), who report results from a consortium 
assessing wage rigidity in 16 countries.1  While these papers are motivated by the importance 
of wage rigidity for employment fluctuations they focus on documenting the relative absence 
of negative nominal wage changes and how these relate to inflation.  On the other hand, this 
literature does not relate wage rigidity directly to employment fluctuations or labor demand 
shocks.   
An exception is the paper by Fehr and Goette (2005) for Switzerland, who correlate estimates 
of wage rigidity across different inflation regimes and cantons to unemployment rates.  They 
find that unemployment is higher when there is more “wage sweep up” due to nominal wage 
rigidity.  Inflation creates implicit variation in the bite of nominal wage rigidity but does not 
directly distinguish more or less flexible contracting arrangements. Hence, their paper does 
not address directly whether more flexible wage contracts would lead to less unemployment. 
Card (1990) relates employment fluctuations directly to contracts with more or less 
flexibility.  He exploits the wage indexing provisions of Canadian union contracts to estimate 
the employment response to unexpected price changes.  Union contracts which do not specify 
any indexing to future price changes fix nominal wages in either direction.  Unexpected 
inflation then resets the wage.  Card (1990) interprets the resulting employment fluctuations 
as movements along a labor demand curve.  This differs somewhat from the exercise I am 
interested in here, which is focused on the response of employment to labor demand shocks 
under different wage contracting regimes.  Instead of a labor demand curve I am trying to 
estimate the wage setting schedule under different contracting regimes. 
Holzer and Montgomery (1993) are interested in the response of wages and employment to 
firm level demand shocks.  Using firm level data, they proxy demand shocks by sales growth.  
1 Despite this evidence, there is considerable debate about the importance of nominal wage rigidity.  For 
example, the absence of wage cuts may be due to measurement error in survey data.  Elsby, Shin, and Solon 
(2016) show that wage cuts are much more frequent in administrative data (which have their own problems) 
than in survey data, and conclude that wages of many job stayers were reasonably flexible during the Great 
Recession. 
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However, in a broad cross-section of firms, sales might reflect both demand and supply 
conditions.  Kaur (2014) studies agricultural labor markets in India, which allows her to 
construct a more credible measure of demand shocks due to rainfall.  However, her market is 
one for day laborers.  As a result, there is no context of a “layoff” in her setting.  Rather, she 
shows that an increase in the spot market wage due to favorable conditions in one year 
persists into the subsequent year when the reasons for the higher wage have dissipated, and 
this translates into lower employment.  This notion of rigid wages is more closely associated 
with rigidity in starting wages rather than the wages in ongoing employment contracts. But 
wages in new jobs are believed to be relatively responsive to labor market conditions in the 
US, see for example Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994), and 
Pissarides (2009). 
Most closely related to my investigation is a paper by Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2012).  
They separate workers into those who work on standard fixed wage contracts and those 
whose who receive part of their compensation as bonus pay.  Regressing wages, hours and 
earnings on a bonus pay dummy interacted with the unemployment rate (as a cyclical 
indicator) they find larger cyclical effects on wages in bonus jobs and larger effects on hours 
in fixed wage jobs.  However, bonus pay is a relatively minor component of total 
compensation in many jobs, and my paper uses occupations with bigger differences in pay 
setting regimes.  Housing market fluctuations are also likely a better labor demand indicator 
than the unemployment rate.  
Also related is the study by Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux (1999) who correlate relative 
employment changes to changes in the cross-sectional wage distribution over time in a 
particular country.  This more aggregate investigation ranks three countries, the US, Canada, 
and France, by the relative rigidity of their wage setting institutions.  This is close in spirit to 
the informal ranking of three different occupations in my study. 
An important prior analysis focusing on real estate agents is the closely related exercise by 
Hsieh and Moretti (2003).  They also regress changes in RE agent employment and earnings 
on changes in house prices.  They find an elasticity close to 1 for employment and almost no 
response of earnings.  However, in contrast to my investigation they look at relatively long 
run (10 year) changes during a period when the housing market in the US was mostly 
booming.  They interpret their results as inefficient entry of workers into an industry where 
the commission rates on sales tend to be fixed irrespective of house price levels.  A relative 
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elastic supply of RE agents absorbs any potential wage gains as the proceeds are being spread 
across more workers.  My study focuses on year-to-year changes which are more likely to 
capture business cycle fluctuations.  In particular, my sample period includes the sharp 
downturn in many housing markets after 2006, which is relevant for the wage flexibility 
story.  Unlike my study, Hsieh and Moretti don’t compare wages and employment to any 
other housing related occupations.   
2  Institutional Arrangements and Analytical Framework 
Real estate agents and brokers facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers in the 
housing market.  An individual has to obtain a state license after completing some 
coursework in order to act as a real estate agent; the entry requirements for this occupation 
are not large.  After some experience and/or with additional education, individuals can 
qualify as a broker, which allows them to set up their own brokerage.2  A broker typically 
employs various agents, who will execute the sales of individual properties.  In most states 
and transactions, a seller enters a legal relationship with a brokerage.  The designated agent 
will carry out a number of specified services related to the transaction for the client.  These 
services include finding a buyer but typically also involve various legal obligations associated 
with the sale.  Clients pay a fee in the form of a commission on the sales price to the 
brokerage for these services.   
Agents are employed by brokers on a variety of contracts.  The most common ones involve 
agents receiving a share of the commission revenue for their sales; this is often referred to as 
percentage commission splits.  Shares of 50 to 80 percent are common in the industry.  Very 
few agents receive a fixed base salary or are paid solely on a salaried basis.  However, it is 
not uncommon for an agent to actually pay the broker a monthly fee while receiving a large 
share of their commission revenue, often 100 percent in this case.  In industry parlance these 
agents “pay for their desk.”  In addition to desk fees these agents typically cover their own 
business expenses (NAR RealtorMag, 2014a; NAR 2014; Shelef and Nguyen-Chyung, 2015). 
There is little precise information on flexible components of pay like commissions.  Various 
labor market surveys contain some coarse information, typically combining sources such as 
2 The specific regulations and nomenclature differs across states. 
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bonuses, commissions, and overtime.  The top panel in Table 1 displays the share of workers 
receiving pay from overtime, tips, and commissions from the CPS for the three occupations 
analyzed here.3  Potentially, all these pay components are related to performance and the 
amount of work available.  More than half the real estate agents respond to receive such 
flexible pay compared to 10 – 15 percent of architects and construction workers.  For 
construction workers this is presumably mostly overtime, which will lose its relevance once 
hours fall below the threshold for overtime pay.  As a result, overtime pay provides some 
wage flexibility in a downturn but wages eventually turn rigid.   
I augment the CPS results with information from industry sources.  According to the Member 
Profile of the National Association of Realtors, 95 percent for agents and brokers receive 
some flexible pay component, which in most cases will be commissions.  It is unclear why 
the CPS fraction is much lower.  NAR members are more likely brokers or more experienced 
and higher earning agents.  These groups tend to be on more high powered contracts but these 
agents are also more likely to receive a salary.  However, if anything, this suggests that the 
fraction reporting commissions in the more representative CPS should be even higher. 
The second panel in Table 1 collates information on the share of pay that is due to the flexible 
pay components.  Unfortunately, I have only been able to locate such information from 
industry sources for architects and construction workers, for whom only 5 percent is due to 
such pay components.  The last number for construction workers on fringe costs of 19 percent 
is probably an overstatement for my purposes, as a large proportion of fringe costs is likely 
part of fixed pay, like employer contributions to health insurance premia.  Unfortunately, 
detailed information is not available for real estate agents but the numbers are likely to be 
substantially higher as commission shares below 50 percent are rare.  NAR (2014) reports 
that 13 percent of agents are on 100 percent commissions and 73 percent on percentage 
commission splits. 
One issue is whether we should think of agents as actually employed by brokers at all, or as 
effectively self-employed.  The IRS has rules as to when agents should be classified as 
independent contractors or employees.  States have their own rules, often based on common 
law guidelines, to determine whether agents are covered by unemployment insurance and 
3 The CPS asks “(Do / Does) (name/you) usually receive overtime pay, tips, or commissions at (your/his/her) 
MAIN job?” 
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workers compensation (NAR RealtorMag, 2014b).  For example, NAR (2014, exhibit 4-4) 
reports that 83 percent of their members are independent contractors and hence effectively 
self-employed.  However, it is important to keep in mind that almost half of the responses 
come from brokers rather than agents.   
On the other hand, 49 percent of real estate agents self-identify as employed in the sample 
from the American Community Survey I use below.  This compares to 72 percent of 
architects and 75 percent of construction workers.  In practice, many real estate agents seem 
to think of themselves as employees. 
The contracts of real estate agents closely approximate a simple, optimal agency contract we 
are used to seeing in a textbook.  Such a contract involves a negative intercept and a slope of 
1. Figure 2 illustrates how agent earnings are a function of the total value of transactions.
These values are the product of the average sales price of a property in market m (Pm) and the 
number of transactions (sales) agent i completes in a month (Sim).  Agent earnings are  
Yim =  + c Pm Sim (1) 
where  is the base salary or desk fee,  is the share of the commission the agent receives (say 
0.5), and c is the commission rate (e.g. 0.06) on the transactions value.  I use ln(Pm Sm) as my 
measure of labor demand shocks in the empirical analysis below, where Sm are market level 
sales.  As Figure 2 illustrates, agent earnings and wages fluctuate directly with transactions 
values in the housing market.   
Note that market level transactions Sm = iLmSim, where Lm is the number of real estate agents 
working in market m.  Fluctuations in the housing market will directly affect Pm and Sm.  
Hsieh and Moretti (2003) have shown that the number of active real estate agents Lm 
responds strongly to price booms, at least at a decadal horizon.  Hence, Sm tends to rise when 
prices rise but Sim could well fall if Lm expands enough.  Every agent simply sells fewer 
houses in a boom so that agent earnings stay the same.  In fact, Hsieh and Moretti (2003) find 
that average earnings of agents don’t rise in booming markets.  I am using the market level 
ln(Pm Sm) as my cyclical indicator and I want this to affect agent earnings.  However, unlike 
Hsieh and Moretti I am looking at annual data and I will show below that agent earnings are 
responsive to ln(Pm Sm) at that frequency. 
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The analysis in this paper is based on a simple demand and supply framework analogous to 
Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux (1999), where the wage setting institutions differ across 
occupational labor markets. Figure 3 illustrates this for two occupations, say real estate 
agents and construction workers.  Each occupation has a wage setting (or labor supply) curve 
and a labor demand curve.  The wage setting curve for construction workers is inelastic, 
reflecting the relatively rigid wages for this group of workers.  The wage setting curve for 
real estate agents is elastic as the wages for this group adjust flexibly to changes in the labor 
market.  Figure 3 shows a common labor demand curve for each of the two groups.  When 
labor demand shifts inwards, as during the housing bust from 2006 – 09, wages fall little for 
construction workers, while there is a large adjustment in employment.  The opposite 
happens for real estate agents where wages fall more and employment adjusts less.   
I treat the market indicator ln(Pm Sm) as a labor demand shifter, and interpret the ratio of the 
employment to the wage response to shocks as the inverse wage setting elasticity of the 
occupation.  The value of housing transactions should measure the labor demand for real 
estate agents very well, as it is directly related to their commissions based earnings.  The link 
for the other occupations is more indirect.  Architects and construction workers are primarily 
engaged in new construction of housing.  New housing permits correlate closely with the 
transactions measure: the elasticity from a panel regression of permits on the transactions 
value controlling for state and time effects is a highly significant 0.37.  Hence, transactions 
values should be an appropriate measure for the labor demand of architects and construction 
workers as well but the wage and employment effects will likely be smaller. 
Another issue with using ln(Pm Sm) as a labor demand shifter for the first decade in 2000s is 
that the boom and bust cycles in the housing market correlate strongly with the financial 
crisis and the general downturn of the economy.  Since labor demand and supply in Figure 3 
are those to an occupation, supply depends crucially on job prospects for workers outside the 
occupation.  An inward shift in labor demand due to the housing bust during the 2006 – 2009 
period may therefore coincide with an inward shift of labor supply (or wage setting) because 
job prospects also deteriorated in other occupations at the same time.   
I deal with this in two ways.  All regression models are estimated at the state level and 
control for aggregate time effects.  I.e. I only use the within state variation in ln(Pm Sm).  To 
the degree that the recession due to the financial crisis affected all states similarly this will be 
washed out by the time effects.  To address within state correlations of labor demand and 
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supply shifts I also control for an “alternative wage” for the occupations under analysis.  This 
is given as the wage of all workers in the state with similar characteristics as the workers in 
the occupation under analysis, and described in more detail in the data section below.  It is 
not a perfect solution as this alternative wage is clearly an equilibrium object. 
3 Data 
The analysis combines labor market data for real estate agents, construction workers and 
architects with data on the economic cycle in the housing sector. Data on the labor market 
comes from the American Communities Survey (ACS) and from the Quarterly Workforce 
Indicators (QWI), housing sales transaction data is from the National Associations of 
Realtors (NAR) and sales prices from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). 
The ACS is a large-scale annual survey of the US population starting in 2000. I select real 
estate agents (1990 occupation code 254), architects (43), and construction workers 
([occupation codes 563 – 599 or 844 – 873] and industry code 23) and construct annual 
employment, average hourly wages, weeks worked per year, and usual hours worked per 
week for these occupations.  The hourly wage measure divides wage and salary income by 
annual hours worked.4  Since the aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of rigidity in 
contracted wages, I exclude the self-employed in the analysis. The main analysis uses data 
aggregated at the state and year level.  While metropolitan areas might be preferable, longer 
time series of house prices are available at the state level. 
To control for potential shifts in labor supply that coincide with demand shifts I construct a 
measure of workers’ “alternative wage.” This variable is meant to proxy for the outside 
option of workers. It is constructed as a weighted average of the wage of similar individuals 
working outside a given occupation. The weights are derived from a probit regression of 
working in that occupation on demographics. To illustrate the process consider the 
“alternative wage” of a real estate agent. I first estimate a probit model for working as a real 
estate agent on seven education dummies, race, a squared term in age, and an interaction of 
gender and marriage dummies.  I calculate this probability separately for each sample year. 
Next I calculate the weighted average wage of all non-real estate agents using the predicted 
4 Annual hours multiply weekly hours by weeks worked using mid-points of the reported bins. 
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probability of being a real estate agent as weight.  This procedure creates an average wage for 
workers in other occupations who look most similar to real estate agents in terms of 
observables.  
One drawback of the ACS is that samples for specific occupations at the state-year level can 
be small, leading for imprecise cell averages.  I therefore complement the ACS data with data 
from the QWI, which is mainly based on administrative records of the state unemployment 
insurance (UI) systems.5 While the QWI covers almost the universe of employment contracts 
in the US, its main drawback is that it excludes jobs outside of the UI system. This excludes 
the self-employment and potentially many real estate agents because the commission-based 
contract prevalent in the industry are exempted from UI coverage in a number of states.  
Apart from this under-coverage, the QWI will most likely capture the agents with the least 
flexible contracts. 
A second drawback is that the QWI only contains information by industry and not occupation 
of the workers. Therefore, I use the NAICS industry codes 5312 for Offices of Real Estate 
Agents and Brokers, 5413 for Architectural, Engineering, and Related Services, and 2361 for 
Residential Building Construction.  This introduces some measurement error as I also capture 
wages and employment of other occupations like secretaries who are likely on different 
contracts. The QWI data start at different points in time for different states mostly in the 
1990s and early 2000s.  This leads to an unbalanced panel but allows me to extend the time 
period for some states (see the appendix for details on the coverage of the QWI data by state). 
The labor market data is linked to data on the regional housing cycle. The data for the total 
value of housing transactions comes from two sources. The price data is taken from the 
annual series of house prices by the FHFA (formerly OFHEO). This data is based on 
mortgages bought by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.6 The index is calculated using two 
5 The source data for the QWI is the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) linked employer- 
employee microdata. The LEHD data is a massive longitudinal database covering over 95 percent of U.S. 
private sector jobs 
6 The FHFA price index uses mortgage data from the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) 
and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). Using an adapted version of the weighted-repeat 
sales method (Case and Shiller, 1989), the price index is estimated using repeated observations of housing 
values for individual single-family residential properties on which at least two mortgages were originated and 
subsequently purchased by either Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae. Source: 
http://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Pages/House-Price-Index-Datasets.aspx#qpo  
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mortgages on the same property and aggregating the data using the Case and Shiller (1989) 
method. The data used here uses single-family residential properties only, starts in 1991, and 
is published annually. Housing sales transactions are obtained from NAR for the years 1989 
to 2010. This data is based on reports of local membership groups and again covers existing 
single-family homes.7 Combining the labor market and housing data leads to a panel 
spanning the years of 2000 to 2010 when using the ACS and an unbalanced panel for the 
years 1991 to 2010 when using the QWI. 
The data on fluctuations in the housing market should capture swings in the demand for the 
three occupations. My preferred measure is the annual value of house sales given by the 
product of the number of transactions and the average sales price. For real estate agents, this 
variable directly tracks the transactions values on which commissions are based. For the other 
two occupations, demand might be thought to be more closely related to the number of new 
construction projects. To address this point I collected data on the value of new housing 
permits issued in each year and state from the Census Bureau’s “Building Permits Survey.” A 
regression of the ln of construction permits on ln housing prices and ln transactions separately 
yields an R2 of 0.3 within states and years, and 0.2 when the regression is run on the product 
of prices and transactions. The value of housing sales should therefore also capture demand 
shifts in architecture and construction well.   
4 Empirical Results 
Table 2 shows regression results from running wage and employment regressions of the form 
ln(Yst) =  + p ln(Pst) + S ln(Sst) + s + t + est (2) 
where Yst is the wage or employment outcome for realtors in state s and year t, Pst is the 
housing price index, Sst is the number of home sales, and s and t are state and year fixed 
effects, respectively.   Regressions are weighted by the number of individuals in a state.  
Column (1) shows that a 10 percent increase in prices or sales translates into about 1.5 
7 The NAR series “Single-Family Existing-Home Sales” is based on closed home sales and captures about 30-40 
percent of all home sales in the US. The data is collected from local realtor associations and multiple listing 
services. This data is not available after 2010.  Data is missing in New Hampshire in four years and Idaho in one 
year.  The data were obtained through personal communication with T. Doyle at NAR on Aug 4, 2014. 
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percent higher hourly wages for real estate agents.  Even though the wage elasticity is well 
below 1, this seems like a substantial effect and is statistically significant.  We would expect 
an elasticity of 1 if the contracts for all agents were simply proportional (i.e.  = 0 in eq. (1) 
above), agent employment would not react to labor demand shocks, and transactions volumes 
Pst Sst were completely accurately measured.  None of these are likely to hold.  Moreover, the 
regression is based on repeated cross-sections, and entry and exit effects will tend to bias the 
estimates of  down if less productive agents enter in booms.  In any case, the estimates are 
large compared to the zero effect found by Hsieh and Moretti (2003). 
Since the coefficients on prices and sales are very similar as expected (although the p-value 
for equality is only about 0.04) it makes sense to restrict them and work with the transactions 
value    ln(Pst Sst) as in column (2) instead.  Adding the alternative wage for real estate agents 
in column (3) makes little difference to the result.  The estimate for the alternative wage is 
positive as expected but imprecisely estimated.   
Columns (4) to (6) repeat the same regressions for the number of realtors employed.  
Elasticities are around 0.5 to 0.6, suggesting substantial employment responses of realtors 
over the cycle.  This mirrors the result of Hsieh and Moretti (2003) that realtors respond to 
the housing cycle through entry and exit, and this will mute some of the wage effects of 
market fluctuations.  To gauge the size of this response we will have to compare realtors to 
other occupations, as we will do shortly.  The result in column (6) shows that the employment 
result is also relatively insensitve to entering the alternative wage, which is now negative. 
Columns (5) to (9) show results for the average number of weeks worked, and columns (10) 
to (12) for hours worked per week.  There seems to be no adjustment at the intensive margin 
as housing markets fluctuate.  If realtor wages are relatively flexible, we might expect a 
smaller employment response for this group but some adjustment on the intensive margin.  
One reason for the absence of an hours response might be the presence of desk fees in agent 
contracts, as illustrated in Figure 2.  Since these fees constitute a fixed cost of work, agents 
may not want to reduce their hours (very much) in response to housing busts but may still 
react by leaving the occupation or employment entirely.  However, many more agents are on 
percentage commission splits and may not pay any desk fees.  It is also surprising that there is 
not more of a response at the weeks margin.   
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It is difficult to gauge whether the wage and employment responses of real estate agents to 
labor demand shocks are large or small by looking at this occupation in isolation.  Therefore, 
I run similar regressions to (2) for architects and construction workers.  Workers in these 
occupations are on much more standard fixed wage contracts with comparatively minor 
flexible components like overtime or bonuses.  One complication in comparing the  
coefficients for different occupations is that hosue price and sales shocks may affect real 
estate agents much more directly than the other occupations.  To circumvent this problem, I 
concentrate on the wage setting elasticity, given by the ratio empl/wage. This ratio is free 
from these scaling problems, since scaling should affect wage and employment results 
proportionally.  Notice that the inverse wage setting elasticity can be obtained from the 
regression of employment on wages 
ln(Lst) = 0 +  ln(Wst) + 1s + 1t + st, (3) 
instrumenting the wage by the demand shock ln(Pst Sst). 
Table 3 displays the results.  Column (1) repeats the estimates of the employment, weekly 
hours and wage elasticities with respect to ln(Pst Sst) for real estate agents; these are the 
estimates from columns (5), (11), and (2) from Table 2, respectively.  The fourth row gives 
the inverse wage setting elasticity, which is the ratio of these two estimates. This comes out 
to 3.5 for the real estate agents.  Columns (2) and (3) display the estimates for architects and 
construction workers.  Both employment and wage responses are lower for these occupations, 
as expected.  What is of more interest is the ratio in row (4) which comes out to 3.7 for 
architects and 28 for construction workers.  The wage setting elasticity is imprecisely 
estimated because the wage effect in the denominator of the ratio is small for both these 
occupations.  The reduced form estimate for weekly hours in row (2) is uniformly small for 
all occupation; indicating little intensive margin response to labor demand shocks for any of 
the occupations. 
Columns (4) to (6) of Table 3 repeat the same estimates with the QWI data.  Both the ACS 
and the QWI data have advantages and disadvantages.  The main strength of the QWI data is 
that they capture the universe of workers covered by the UI system, while the ACS samples 
are small for the specific occupations analyzed here.  Indeed, the QWI estimates are generally 
more precise.  The inverse wage setting elasticities are 2.2 for real estate agents, 4.3 for 
architects, and 3.5 for construction workers. 
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While individual estimates differ somewhat, the general pattern of results is quite consistent 
across the two data sets.  Real estate agents have the most elastic wage setting schedule.  This 
indicates that the employment of realtors reacts less to wage fluctuations.  The relatively 
more elastic wage setting schedule for architects and construction workers, on the other hand, 
indicates that sizeable employment fluctuations and small wage changes happen in response 
to demand shocks for these occupations.   
5 Conclusion 
There is a sizeable literature on downward  nominal wage rigidity and many economists 
believe that this is a source of employment fluctuations over the business cycle.  
Nevertheless, there is not much evidence linking rigid wages directly to employment 
outcomes as I have done here.    I do indeed find that the wages of real estate agents react 
more and employment less to labor demand shocks than they do for architects and 
construction workers, who tend to have more rigid wage setting institutions.  Comparing 
narrow occuapations which work in a highly cyclical industry is attractive because we have a 
good sense how pay setting institutions differ across these occupations. 
But focusing on narrow occupations also has shortcomings.  Neither the ACS nor the QWI 
are ideal data sources for this exercise.  Even in the ACS, cell sizes for real estate agents or 
architects at the state-year level are small.  The QWI is not ideally suited to capture 
occupations like real estate agents who often work as independent contractors, it only 
identifies workers by industry not occupation, and it only measures total quarterly earnings 
rather than hourly wages.  These complications are likely all contributing to the realtively 
noisy results.  It is therefore comforting that a fairly consistent pattern of results still emerges 
from both data sets.  
Both data sets are effectively repeated cross-sections and hence are subject to the problem 
that the composition of the workforce is changing over the cycle.  Typically, lower paid 
workers are more likely to leave an occupation in a downturn.  This would make wages look 
less cyclical than they are and will bias the inverse wage setting elasticities upwards.   It is 
difficult to gauge how much this problem differs across the three occupations.  We might 
expect this to affect real estate agents the most since this is the group with the largest 
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employment response to the cyclical shocks.  As a result, differences between occupations 
would be larger than those apparent in Table 3.  Comprehensive panel data on these 
occupations would be necessary to say more on this problem.8 
How big are the differences in employment responses of real estate agents and the other 
occupations?  The estimates for the wage setting elasticity are not particularly precise and the 
specific results differ somewhat between the ACS and QWI estimates.  It is still useful to take 
the estimates at face value and consider their implications.  Real estate agents exhibit the 
smallest wage setting elasticities among the three occupations in both data sets but the wage 
setting elasticities for them of 2.2 to 3.5 are still sizeable.   Consider an occupation where 
wages are completely fixed, so that a labor demand shock translates one for one into a change 
in employment.  Compared to this benchmark, employment for real estate agents would 
contract by /( + ) in a simple static demand and supply framework, where  is the wage 
setting elasticity as before, and  is minus the elasticity of labor demand.  Setting  = 0.5 (as 
in Card, 1990)9 and  = 2.2 would imply employment declining by 82 percent of the 
benchmark case; or 88 percent for  = 3.5.  Since wage setting of architects and construction 
workers is not completely elastic either this does not seem like a huge difference compared to 
these more fixed wage occupations.  Hence, if flexibility of wage setting is one of the sources 
of employment fluctuations over the business cycle, then moving all occupations to the same 
level of flexibility as exhibited by real estate agents would still leave a large part of these 
employment fluctuations in place unless labor demand is much more elastic. 
8 Sample sizes in Current Population Survey matched across years are too small to make any headway on this. 
9 Hamermesh (1993) puts the consensus estimate of the own elasticity of labor demand even lower at 0.3. 
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Table 1: Prevalence of Flexible Pay in Housing Related Occupations 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Share of workers receiving flexible pay 























Share of flexible pay in income for workers receiving it 













Diff between base 




Construction worker PAS 2014 JourneymenAll trades 




Sources: NAR: NAR (2014), Exhibit 3-1: sales agents with commissions or profit sharing; AIA: AIA (2011), 
Exhibit 1-5: architects and designers in all firm; Dietrich Surveys: Personal email correspondence with Wayne 
Dietrich on July 31, 2014; PAS: PAS (2014), p. 7, average fringe. 
Notes: CPS percentages in the top panel refer to employed workers only; percentage from the NAR refers to 
sales agents. 
22 
Table 2: Wage and Employment Cyclicality of Real Estate Agents 
Dependent variable
ln hourly wage ln employed individuals ln average weeks ln average weekly hours 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
ln HPI (P) 0.144 0.611  -0.002  -0.032 
(0.066)  (0.129)  (0.025)  (0.023) 
ln sales volume (S) 0.158  0.497  0.010  -0.004 
(0.075)  (0.111)  (0.025)  (0.019) 
ln HPI x sales 0.153 0.138  0.537 0.585 0.006 0.019 -0.014 -0.005 
(0.060) (0.076)  (0.101) (0.107) (0.022) (0.027) (0.017) (0.023) 
ln alternative  0.341  -1.052  -0.292  -0.197 
wage  (0.599)  (0.956)  (0.240)  (0.274) 
p-value for equality 
of P and S 0.038  0.000  0.861  0.360 
Notes: The regressions are based on 559 state-year observations spanning the period from 2000 to 2010.  All models include year and state fixed effects and are 
estimated using weighted least squares, with the number of individuals represented by an aggregate state observation as weight. The dependent variable is 
constructed by aggregating individual data from the ACS at the state-year level. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. 
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Table 3: Wage and Employment Cyclicality of Different Housing Related Occupations 
ACS by occupation QWI by industry 
realtor architect construction realtor architect construction 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
employment effect 0.537 0.357 0.333 0.386 0.293 0.497 
(0.101) (0.109) (0.063) (0.082) (0.065) (0.094)
weekly hours effect -0.014 -0.073 0.030 
(0.017) (0.025) (0.009)
wage effect 0.153 0.095 0.012 0.173 0.069 0.140 
(0.060) (0.057) (0.016) (0.039) (0.022) (0.051)
inverse wage setting  3.50 3.75 27.23 2.23 4.27 3.55 
elasticity (1.35) (2.19) (33.70) (0.73) (0.90) (1.34)
Note: Sample period is 2000-2010 for the ACS (559 observations, architects 539 due to empty cells) & 1991-2010 for the QWI (667 observations). ACS groups are 
based on occupation, QWI groups based on industry. Cycle variable is total value of house transactions (price x volume). Average wage is the hourly wage for ACS, 
the monthly wage for QWI. Regressions are weighted with the number of individuals represented by an aggregate state observation as weight.   Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the state level. 
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Appendix 
Availability of QWI data by state 
State Start year 
Start 
quarter State Start year 
Start 
quarter 
AK 2000 1 MT 1993 1
AL 2001 1 NC 1992 4
AR 2002 3 ND 1998 1
AZ 2004 1 NE 1999 1
CA 1991 3 NH 2003 1
CO 1993 2 NJ 1996 1
CT 1996 1 NM 1995 3
DC 2005 2 NV 1998 1
DE 1998 3 NY 2000 1
FL 1997 4 OH 2000 1
GA 1998 1 OK 2000 1
HI 1995 4 OR 1991 1
IA 1998 4 PA 1997 1
ID 1991 1 RI 1995 1
IL 1993 2 SC 1998 1
IN 1998 1 SD 1998 1
KS 1993 1 TN 1998 1
KY 2001 1 TX 1995 1
LA 1995 1 UT 1999 3
MA NA VA 1998 3
MD 1990 1 VT 2000 1
ME 1996 2 WA 1990 1
MI 2000 3 WI 1990 1
MN 1994 3 WV 1997 1
MO 1995 1 WY 2001 1
MS 2003 3
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